The Professions and Noncommercial Purposes:  Applicability of Per Se Rules Under the Sherman Act by Dickey, Jonathan Cobb
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 11
1978 
The Professions and Noncommercial Purposes: Applicability of 
Per Se Rules Under the Sherman Act 
Jonathan Cobb Dickey 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Legal Profession Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jonathan C. Dickey, The Professions and Noncommercial Purposes: Applicability of Per Se Rules Under 
the Sherman Act, 11 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 387 (1978). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol11/iss3/7 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
THE PROFESSIONS AND NONCOMMERCIAL 
PURPOSES: APPLICABILITY OF PER SE RULES 
UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT 
Until the Supreme Court's decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 1 
invalidating a bar association's minimum fee schedules as an illegal price-
fixing arrangement, it was generally thought that the so-called learned 
professions were exempt from the prohibitions of the Sherman Act.2 With 
the Court's sharp rejection of this view, it is clear that the associations 
established for professional self-regulation are answerable for violations 
of the antitrust laws. 3 Yet to be resolved is whether the professions are to 
1 421 U.S. 773, rehearing denied, 423 U.S. 886 (1975). 
2 Section I of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § I (1970), proscribes "[e]very contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States .... " Besides the requirements that the activity affect 
"trade or commerce," the Act also requires that the challenged restraint involve interstate 
commerce. See note 3 infra. 
3 Notwithstanding Goldfarb, significant areas of conduct by professions may still be 
exempt from Sherman Act prohibitions. Litigation has focused most frequently upon the 
following areas: 
State Action. Goldfarb held that there could be no exemption for the bar association's fee 
schedules on grounds of state action, see Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), but the 
opinion left undecided whether other professional activities might be held exempt on those 
grounds. In Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977), the state action exemption was 
held to apply to the state bar's rule against advertising, since the Arizona State Supreme 
Court compelled members of the bar to observe the rule. On the state action exemption and 
recent limitations upon it, see Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Surety 
Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va. 19TI), vacated 
[1978-1) TRADE CAs. (CCH) ,i 61,406 (4th Cir. 1978); City of Fairfax, Va. v. Fairfax Hosp. 
Ass'n, [1976-2) TRADE CAS. (CCH) ,I 60,999 (E.D. Va. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 
3658 (Apr. 24, 1978). 
Noerr-Pennington. Another recognized exemption to the Sherman Act exists for activities 
that seek a legislative response to particular business or professional concerns. See United 
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr 
Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961); City of Mishawaka, Ind. v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 
560 F.2d 1314 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3420 (1978). But see Mountain Grove 
Cemetery Ass'n v. Norwalk Vault Co. of Bridgeport, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 951 (D. Conn. 1977) 
("sham exception"). 
Intrastate Commerce. Jurisdiction under the Sherman Act requires that the alleged 
anticompetitive conduct affect "commerce among the several States," see note 2 supra. 
Consequently, activities that touch only upon intrastate commerce will be exempted. See, 
e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of the Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976). 
Antitrust enforcement pertaining to the professions has been expanding under the parallel 
provisions of§ 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970). See, e.g., In re American Dental 
Ass'n, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ,i 21,255 (complaint issued Jan. 4, 19TI); In re American 
Medical Ass'n, [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ,i 21,068 (complaint 
issued Dec. 19, 1975). See also [1978) ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 844 at 
A-14 (FTC opens industry wide probe of restrictions on legal services); [1977) ANTITRUST & 
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 812 at A-15 (FTC official predicts expansion of antitrust 
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be judged by the same antitrust standards as those applied to the conduct 
of profitmaking business entities. 
Under current antitrust standards, certain recurring business practices 
have been deemed illegal per se under the Sherman Act. 4 However, 
where a practice challenged under a per se rule is sufficiently germane to 
some legitimate self-regulatory purpose-such as the establishment of 
membership standards for private associations-per se concepts have 
generally been displaced by the rule of reason. Especially in litigation 
involving trade associations, the lack ofa competitive relationship and the 
uniform operation of the particular restraint have removed the conduct 
from per se treatment. In effect, the noncommercial purpose of the 
particular restraint has caused it to fall outside the class of per se invalid 
res train ts. 5 
efforts in health care area); [19n] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 802 at A-4 
(FfC investigating alleged discrimination against psychologists by physician accreditation 
group). Cf. In re American Dental Ass'n, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ,i 21,328 (Jan. 18, 1978) 
(denying motion to dismiss complaint on grounds that FfC lacked jurisdiction over non-
profit organization). 
The remedies provided under the Sherman, Clayton, and FfC Acts are not mutually 
exclusive. Indeed, they are commonly regarded as providing a cumulative remedy. Sections 
1-3 of the Sherman Act make violations punishable as felonies and provide for substantial 
fines and imprisonment within the discretion of the court. Authority to institute criminal 
proceedings is lodged in the Department of Justice. For an example of the stiff penalties 
imposed, see United States v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ,i 45,007 (D. 
Conn. 1978), in which price-fixing convictions resulted in fines totalling over $800,000 and 
sentences of up to 30 months. While the Justice Department's policy is to institute criminal 
proceedings only for wilful violations, wilfulness will be presumed where a per se violation is 
shown. See THE PRESIDENT'S CoMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 
OF JUSTICE, CRIME AND ITS IMPACT, AN ASSESSMENT 110 (1967). Asst. Attorney-General 
Donald Baker has urged stiffer jail sentences for antitrust violators and has recommended a 
flat 18 month sentence rule, with greater sentences in case of corporate recidivism. See N. Y. 
Times, Nov. 21, 1976, at 27, col. I. The private treble damage remedy is authorized under 
§ 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). Damages include amounts passed on to con-
sumers, see Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968). But see 
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (19n) (recovery limited to direct purchasers). 
• The classic statement of the per se theory is contained in Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. 
United States, 356 U.S. I, 5 (1958): 
[nhere are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect 
on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be 
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm 
they have caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle of per se 
unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the 
Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids 
the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation 
into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an 
effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable-
an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken. 
For a discussion of the per se and rule of reason theories, see text accompanying notes 7-15 
infra. 
5 The many discussions dealing with the doctrine of noncommercial purpose have gener-
ally concluded that to be illegal, a combination must be formed for the purpose and with the 
effect of restraining trade. See, e.g., Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust 
Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 847 (1955); Bauer, Professional Activities and the Antitrust Laws, 
50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 570 (1975); Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act 
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A profession is distinguishable from an ordinary commercial enterprise 
because of its preeminently noncommercial purpose and its extensive 
self-regulatory powers. The recent acceleration of antitrust litigation in-
volving the professions has generated much confusion over the applicabil-
ity of per se rules to professional defendants, particularly in the area of 
group boycott. 6 Because a per se rule ordinarily eliminates the need for 
the antitrust plaintiff to prove the unreasonableness of the conduct, a 
defendant profession might be barred from introducing evidence of the 
challenged practice's noncommercial purpose. 
This article will examine the doctrine of noncommercial purpose in the 
professional context and assess whether conduct undertaken by the pro-
fessions conforms to the presumptions underlying the per se doctrine. It is 
the thesis of this article that the per se doctrine should not preclude 
inquiry into whether a valid noncommercial purpose justifies conduct 
undertaken in good faith by a profession to regulate its membership or to 
advance some other public interest. This article concludes that, with 
respect to professions, the goals of the Sherman Act are better served by 
inquiry into noncommercial purposes and application of the rule ofreason 
than by rigid adherence to the per se doctrine. 
I. STANDARDS UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT 
The literal language of the Sherman Act prohibits all business practices 
''in restraint of trade." Given that every business practice aims to restrain 
trade, however, courts have traditionally applied a rule of reason in 
Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 705 (1962); Horsley, Per Se Il/ega/ity and Concerted Refusals to 
Deal, 13 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 484 (1972). 
In United States v. National Soc'y of Prof. Eng's, 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. Im), aff' d, 46 
U .S.L. W. 4356 (1978), the District of Columbia Circuit Court recognized the viability of the 
doctrine of noncommercial purpose when "narrowly defined in terms of intended social 
benefits." 555 F.2d at 983. As another court concludes, "this adoption of a 'commerciaV 
noncommercial' activity dividing line is perhaps just an application of the 'Rule of Reason'." 
United States v. Oregon State Bar, 385 F. Supp. 507, 517 (D. Ore. 1974). That is, conduct 
undertaken in good faith for a substantially noncommercial purpose arguably lacks the re-
quisite anticompetitive purpose necessary for a Sherman Act violation. 
6 This article concentrates primarily upon group boycott activity by the professions 
because it is an area of intense legal activity concerning the doctrine of noncommercial 
purpose. The case law confirms that there is simply no clear definition of a group boycott. 
As one court has phrased it: "[l]o state that the law concerning group boycotts and Section 
I of the Sherman Act lacks consistency would be to understate the truth by a wide margin." 
Cullum Elec. & Mechanical, Inc. v. Mechanical Contractors Ass'n of S. C., 436 F. Supp. 
418, 429 (D.S.C. 1976), ajf d, 509 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1978). As used in this discussion, the 
term "group boycott" refers to collective conduct that is per se illegal under § I of the 
Sherman Act. Collective action that is not a per se offense may still be anticompetitive and 
illegal but is not a group boycott. A valid noncommercial purpose may remove the conduct 
from the group boycott definition, because only group conduct that is clearly anticompeti-
tive constitutes a group boycott. See text accompanying note 34 infra. 
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judging anticompetitive practices under the Act. 7 Under the standard of 
reasonableness, competing economic and social values can be proffered 
to justify the challenged activity. One of the benefits of the rule of reason 
is that it allows the court to consider economic and other evidence 
probative of industry conditions that would be excluded under the per se 
standard. Moreover, it arguably constitutes a closer approximation of the 
competition policy of the Act because only conduct that has been sub-
jected to rigorous judicial scrutiny is ultimately condemned.8 The costs, 
of course, are those associated with any protracted undertaking: time and 
·uncertainty. 9 
The several per se rules were developed in response to the proliferation 
of antitrust cases involving similar practices that had predictably been 
proven unreasonable and therefore illegal. 10 In a sense, per se rules "play 
7 Consider Judge Hand's commendation of the rule of reason in United States v. As-
sociated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), affd, 326 U.S. I (1945): 
[A]s everyone now agrees ... restriction alone is not enough to stamp a combina-
tion as illegal; it must be "unreasonable" in the sense that the common law 
understood that word; and that never has been, and indeed in the nature of things 
never can be, defined in general terms. Courts must proceed step by step, applying 
retroactively the standard proper for each situation as it comes up, just as they do 
in the case of negligence, reasonable notice, and the like. 
Id. at 368. 
8 Thus in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), Justice Brandeis 
pronounced that in determining the reasonableness of a particular restraint 
the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the 
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the 
nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, 
the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the 
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a 
good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but 
because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict 
consequences. 
Id. at 238. See also White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U,S. 253 (1963); Standard Oil Co. 
v. United States, 221 U.S. l (1911); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel, 85 F. 271 (6th 
Cir. 1898). But see Professor Bork's attack upon the Brandeis formula in Bork, The Rule of 
Reason and the Per Se Concept, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 782 (1965). 
9 Consider, for instance, the· antitrust suit currently being litigated against IBM by the Jus-
tice Dept., a case that is not expected to be resolved until 1985. As of 1976, the Justice De-
partment had already spent about $5 million on the case. An earlier suit brought by Control 
Data Corp. against IBM, which was settled in 1973, involved discovery of over 30 million 
documents and spawned Control Data's computer litigation service now subscribed to by a 
number of large corporations. Perhaps the longest antitrust suit to date was brought by the 
Government against El Paso Natural Gas Co. The Government finally won-16 years later. 
An interesting statistical summary of another large antitrust case involving the nation's lead-
ing investment banking firms may be found in an appendix to Judge Medina's 200 page opin-
ion in Morgan v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 621, 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). As Judge Medina 
concluded: "[l]n my judgment, the only hope of cutting these conspiracy cases down to size 
lies in the exercise of a sound discretion by the Dept. of Justice." Id. at 827. See also 
Kohlmeier, Antitrust Litigation: It's Big Business, N. Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1976, § 3, at 2, col. 
3. 
10 The Supreme Court recently commented upon the rationale of per se rules in a case that 
put a stop to the much criticized per se treatment of vertical territorial restraints, specifically 
overruling the Court's earlier decision in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 
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the percentages": per se conduct that is, in fact, reasonable is sufficiently 
rare that the gains of a per se rule outweigh the cost of an occasional 
unjustified result. Per se rules effectively shorten the process of judicial 
inquiry in cases involving per se restraints; antitrust plaintiffs need not 
prove the unreasonablness of the conduct once they show that it falls 
within one of the per se categories. Per se rules are perceived as promo-
ting values not only of judicial economy but also of certainty and 
prophylaxsis. 11 Thus, the per se doctrine puts the business community on 
notice that certain practices will not be tolerated. 
Several recent decisions in the federal courts reflect continuing unease 
with the per se doctrine, even in traditional areas of enforcement. 12 One 
reason for this unease is the perceived value of certain restraints in 
creating market efficiencies that might result in benefits to the con-
sumer.13 Indeed, respected authorities argue that the courts have over-
reached both the Act's economic and social goals in propagating the 
365 (1967): 
Per se rules thus require the Court to make broad generalizations about the social 
utility of particular commercial practices.- The probability that anticompetitive 
consequences will result from a practice and the severity of those consequences 
must be balanced against its pro-competitive consequences. Cases that do not fit 
the generalization may arise, but a per se rule reflects the judgment that such cases 
are not sufficiently common or important to justify the time and expense· necessary 
to identify them. 
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (19TI). See also United 
States v. Topco Assocs. 405 U.S. 596, 609-10 (1972); United States v. Container Corp. of 
America, 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
II See, e.g., Bird, Sherman Act Limitations on Non-commercial Concerted Refusals to 
Deal, 1970 DUKE L.J. 247, 282 (1970); Louis, Vertical Distributional Restraints under 
Schwinn and Sylvania, 75 MICH. L. REV. 275, 277 (1976). 
12 See, e.g., Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977): 
Once established, per se rules tend to provide guidance to the business community 
and to minimize the burden on litigants and the judicial system of the more complex 
rule of reason trials ... but those advantages are not sufficient in themselves to 
justify the creation of per se rules. If it were otherwise, all of antitrust law would be 
reduced to per se rules, thus introducing an unintended and undesired rigidity in the 
law. 
Id. at 50 n.16. See also United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 341 
(1969) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 563 F. 2d 54 (2d Cir. 
19TI), rehearing granted (Dec. 15, 1977); Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 
437 F. Supp. 1268 (D. Neb. 1977); United States v. Nu-Phonics, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 1006 
(E.D. Mich. 1977); Freeman v. Eastman-Whipstock, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 685, 690 n.9 (S.D. 
Tex. 1975); 16J J. VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: ANTITRUST LAWS AND 
TRADE REGULATION § 76.02 [hereinafter cited as VON KALINOWSKI]; Robinson, Recent 
Antitrust Developments: 1975, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 191, 226-35 (1976). 
13 For example, restrictions on the business activities of business partners require those 
partners to focus their efforts upon the partnership's business, and prevent nonproducing 
partners from enjoying a free ride. Similarly, mergers might create certain management 
efficiencies not otherwise possible where businesses operate independently. Among other 
efficiencies made po_ssible by various vertical and horizontal restraints are stable relation-
ships with resellers, larger scales of operations, reduction of selling costs, greater reseller 
expertise, and more accurate estimation of output required. See Bork, The Rule of Reason 
and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 429-65 (1966). 
See also Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers: A Structural Synthesis, 87 YALE L. J. I 
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various per se rules .14 Similarly, it is argued that overzealous protection 
of the small businessman is achieved at the cost of potentially higher 
prices and less uniform merchantability of goods, among other effects. 15 
Debate over the competition policy of the Sherman Act continues, and 
there are compelling arguments against converting the Act into a strict 
liability statute through expanded use of per se rules. 
In spite of the need to use per se rules cautiously, many courts persist in 
applying them to conduct that does not fit the traditional per se mold. Per 
se rules reflect the courts' long experience with commercial antitrust 
defendants who invariably share the same primary purpose: profitmaking. 
This apparent predictability of purpose is not necessarily true in the 
professional setting, where courts have recognized self-regulation-a 
noncommercial purpose-as a legitimate justification for otherwise anti-
competitive behavior. To facilitate discussion of the noncommercial pur-
pose exception to per se illegality for the professions, it will be helpful to 
reconsider Goldfarb and the learned profession exemption. 
(1977); Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What Else 
Counts? 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1191 (1977); Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense 
Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699 (1977); Weston, Antitrust: The Coming Battlefield, Wall 
St. J., Apr. 14, 1978, at 18, col. 3. 
In the recently litigated suit brought by Beneey Photo against Eastman Kodak resulting in 
one of the largest antitrust awards in history, the plaintiff successfully argued that because of 
Kodak's monopoly of the camera business, Kodak's introduction of a new camera was 
anticompetitive since only Kodak had the technology to process the film for the new 
camera. Kodak defended on the ground that requiring Kodak to share its new technology 
with competitors would undermine the free enterprise system. One commentator has agreed 
that the decision against Kodak will not promote competition: corporations will be 
discouraged from developing products because the costs advantage created by such new 
technology will be lost. See Clearwaters, Better Mousetrap Builders, Beware, N. Y. Times, 
Feb. 26, 1978:, § F, at 14, col. I. But see Wilson, Barriers to Trustbusting: "Efficiency" 
Myths and Timid Trustbusters, 9 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 19 (1977). 
14 See Bork, supra note 13, at 474 in which Professor Bone criticizes 
the tendency to oversimplify economic phenomena, to carry over rules of per se 
illegality, proper in the cartel contexts in which they evolved, to situations in which 
restriction of output was patently neither intended nor effected. This misuse of the 
per se concept destroys efficiency and hence misallocates resources. The overex-
tension of the per se concept by the courts thus has the same sort of effect upon 
consumers as do cartel agreements. 
See also Bone, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. OF LAW & EcoN. 7 
(1966); Kauper, The "Warren Court" and the Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Populism, and 
Cynicism, 67 MICH. L. REv. 325, 334 (1968). 
The purely social goals of the Sherman Act have been variously described as aimed at 
stemming the tide towards cartelization, preserving democracy via the protection of compe-
tition in the maneetplace, and the like. Compare, e.g., AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS ,r 121 
(2d ed. 1974), with von Kalinowski, The Per Se Doctrine-An Emerging Philosophy of 
Antitrust Law, 11 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 569, 591 (1964). See generally Symposium, Antitrust 
Jurisprudence: A Symposium on the Economic, Political and Social Goals of Antitrust 
Policy, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1182 (1977). 
10 See, e.g .. [1977] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 816 at A-12 (Economists 
at FTC conference criticize increased antitrust efforts in health care). 
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II. THE PROFESSIONS: NONCOMMERCIAL PuRPOSES AND MARKET IMPACT 
A. Origins of the Professions' Special Status 
The learned profession exemption16 evolved long before the present era 
of massive consumer reliance upon professional services. 17 In the few 
reported antitrust cases involving professions, lower courts seldom ar-
ticulated their reasons for exempting professional conduct from antitrust 
scrutiny beyond formulaic expressions that the Sherman Act was ''tai-
lored ... for the business world" 18 and that the professions were distinct 
from the traditional class of antitrust defendants. This exemption came to 
be understood as involving jurisdictional defects, principally a lack of 
involvment with "trade or commerce. " 19 Goldfarb resolved the jurisdic-
tional dispute by finding that legal services have a significant impact on 
interstate commerce. For purposes offuture antitrust scrutiny, however, 
the Court noted a distinction between commercial and noncommercial 
activities of professions and specifically limited its consideration to the 
issues presented by the defendant's minimum fee schedules.20 Thus the 
Court's finding of classic price-fixing in Goldfarb, a practice that would 
18 The so-called learned profession exemption was judicially created, unlike the labor 
exemption to the Sherman Act provided by§ 6 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §17 (1970), or 
the agricultural exemption in§ I of the Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1970), and§ 5 
of the Cooperative Marketing Act of 1926, 7 U.S.C. § 455 (1970). Although never directly 
passed on by the Supreme Court until Goldfarb, the learned profession exemption was 
recognized by many lower courts. See generally VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 12, at § 
79.04, and cases cited therein. 
17 As an example of the market power wielded by industries involving professional 
services, the health industry has been said to be the third largest in the nation, accounting for 
7. 7% of the current GNP and employing more than 4.5 million individuals. INSTITUTE OF 
MEDICINE, CoNTROLS ON HEALTH CARE: PAPERS OF THE CoNFERENCE ON REGULATION IN 
THE HEAL TH INDUSTRY 6 (1974). 
18 Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary 
Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 654 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970) (holding that 
exclusion of proprietary college from defendant association would be scrutinized under rule 
of reason). See also Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427 (1932); In re 
Nymph, 18 F. Cas. 506 (C.C.D. Me. 1834). 
19 See, e.g., FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931); Federal Baseball Club v. 
National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). See also Note, The Sherman Act and the Medical 
Profession, 34 ILL. L. REv. 602 (1940). 
•• The Court thus commented, 421 U.S. at 788 n.17: 
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a 
business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint 
violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of profes-
sions as interchangeable with other business activities and automatically apply to 
the professions antitrust concepts which originated in other areas. The public· 
service aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a particular 
practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in 
another context, be treated differently. We intimate no view on any other situation 
than the one with which we are confronted today. 
While it cannot be said categorically that the Court had the per se doctrine in mind when it 
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normally invoke a per se rule, cannot be read as mandating the per-
functory application of per se rules to all self-regulatory activities under-
taken by the professions. 21 
B. Noncommercial Purposes 
It has long been recognized that the professions differ fundamentally 
from ordinary commercial businesses and, consequently, merit more 
liberal treatment under the antitrust laws.22 Courts have generally as-
sumed that the professions exist for reasons in addition to the profit 
motive.23 The essence of the concept of "profession" is the power to 
self-regulate and to promote standards of practice that benefit the public 
at large as well as the individual practitioner. 24 Professional societies have 
traditionally operated as clearinghouses for the exchange of ideas and 
concerns among individual practitioners. Without this exchange, the im-
petus towards improved standards of practice and the dissemination of 
practical information and new developments might otherwise grind to a 
halt, and the profession would stagnate. Moreover, the sum of profes-
sionals acting in concert is greater than the sum of professionals individu-
ally; the power of numbers gives teeth to the ethical and social considera-
tions that ultimately define professional practice. Of course there is equal 
potential for mischief under such an alignment,25 but the benefits of 
higher standards, technological innovations, and greater appreciation of 
consumer needs have been substantial. 
referred to antitrust concepts, it at least appears that the issue of a per se versus rule of 
reason standard was argued to the Court in Goldfarb. See 43 U.S.L.W. 3521 (1975). For an 
interpretation of the Court's cryptic footnote, see Robinson, supra note 12.·See also Klor's, 
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 n.7 (1959). 
21 See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 5, at 592. 
22 The professions, like certain other regulated industries, are natural monopolies. Since 
they contribute so substantially to the public welfare, it has been felt that trade restraints 
which necessarily accompany this monopoly power should be given greater deference by the 
courts. See, e.g., Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. 1258, 
1263 (N.D. Fla. 1976). 
23 In United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952), Justice 
Jackson observed: 
[T]here are ethical considerations where the historic direct relationship between 
patient and physician is involved which are quite different than the usual considera-
tions prevailing in ordinary commercial matters. This Court has recognized that 
forms of competition usual in the business world may be demoralizing to the ethical 
standards of a profession. 
See also Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 612 (1935); 
Northern ·ea1. Pharm. Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d 379, 389 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 
U.S. 862 (1962); Bank Bldg. & Equip. Corp. v. N.C.A.R.B., [1975-1] TRADE CAs. (CCH) 
,r 60,108 (D.D.C. 1975); Levin v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 233 F. Supp. 953 (D.D.C. 1964). 
24 See, e.g., Button v. Day, 204 Va. 547, 132 S.E. 2d 292 (1963), cited by the Court in 
Goldfarb, which held that the state bar was authorized by the Virginia State Bar Act to 
promote reform in the law, to advance the science of jurisprudence, to facilitate the 
administration of justice, and generally to uphold the public interest. 
25 Consider, for example, the action taken by the Michigan Psychological Association 
against a controversial psychologist who was accused of violating six of the association's 
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C. Self-Regulation and Market Impact 
Besides the noncommercial aspects of the professional network de-
scribed above, there exists a complementary26 self-regulatory aspect that 
differentiates the professions from the customary antitrust defendant. A 
professional society is ordinarily empowered, for example, to punish a 
member's egregious conduct in order to maintain the integrity of the 
profession and to assure consumers that its practitioners possess certain 
minimum levels ofcompetence.27 Moreover, the standards against which 
an abuse is judged are often peculiarly within the expertise of the particu-
lar profession, making self-regulation more efficient than judicial en-
forcement. In this sense, per se rules overlook the burden that profes-
sional self-regulation has saved the courts. Internal control is less likely to 
continue if courts automatically impose liability upon the professions for 
good faith conduct taken in response to difficult questions of professional 
standards. 
The presence of pervasive self-regulatory powers can have important 
consequences for market analysis of professional activities. First, re-
straints imposed by professional societies do not have the same impact 
upon competitive relations among practitioners as ordinary business re-
straints. In the traditional commercial setting, competitors vie for a share 
of the market, and ordinarily one person's gain is another person's loss. In 
the professional setting, however, all members of a particular profession 
voluntarily submit to the limitations imposed by that profession. An 
individual practitioner does not vie with a professional society for a share 
of the market in professional services; nor are ethical constraints or 
standards of competency aimed at one practitioner, but at the profession 
as a whole. Second, professional restraints do not necessarily have the 
same effects upon consumers as ordinary business restraints. For exam-
ple, one familiar area of conflict between professionals and consumers 
concerns accreditation of professional schools. 28 By limiting access to a 
rules of conduct. A private hearing was held to determine whether the psychologist should 
have his license revoked. Specifically, it was alleged that he urged patients not to have 
contact with friends, colleagues, or even family members, and encouraged them to become 
excessively involved, both financially and personally, in therapy that often increased their 
stress. The psychologist has denied wrongdoing in his group therapy practice and has 
accused the association of ousting him after holding a kangaroo court. Detroit Free Press, 
Dec. 2, 1977, at 120, col. I. 
26 Certain noncommercial purposes of professions are not strictly self-regulatory. Thus, a 
group of physicians who take action against an allegedly unsafe abortion clinic are arguably 
more concerned with protecting the public welfare than satisfying their duty of self-
regulation. For a discussion of the case from which the above facts are drawn, see text 
accompanying notes 50-56 infra. 
27 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 395.01 to .171 (1975 & West Supp. 1977), which 
authorizes the formation of hospital review committees to oversee the medical practices and 
standards of care being provided by hospitals. 
28 See [1977] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 802 at A-4 (FTC criticizes AMA 
involvement in accreditation of medical schools); id. at No. 808 at A-6 (HEW advisory group 
rejects FTC criticism of medical school accreditation committee). 
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given profession, the national societies have clearly had an effect on the 
market in qualified professionals. It is not clear, however, that these 
actions are therefore anticompetitive, because accreditation is considered 
essential to establish and maintain the standards of professionalism upon 
which consumers rely. Indeed, creating greater access to professional 
practice may result in such a vastly changed service "product" that 
traditional understandings of market share and anticompetitive impact 
would be rendered less than helpful, if not wholly useless. 29 In short, the 
difficulty of applying traditional market analyses to activities of profes-
sional societies is exacerbated by the important self-regulatory functions 
served by those societies. 
Taken together, the professions' traditional exercise of extensive self-
regulatory powers and the ambiguity of the economic effects of regulation 
suggest that a cautious approach be taken under the antitrust laws. Since 
the existence of an ostensible noncommercial purpose is essential to 
avoid per se illegality for many self-regulatory activities, the pertinent 
inquiry in determining the appropriate antitrust standard is to identify 
those noncommercial purposes important enough to compete with the 
substantial goals of the Sherman Act. 
Ill. NONCOMMERCIAL PuRPOSE AND THE PROFESSIONS: 
A DEFENSE TO SHERMAN AcT CHALLENGE 
A. Noncommercial Purpose in Nonprofessional Contexts 
In areas other than the professions, courts do not apply rules of per se 
illegality where the anticompetitive effect of group conduct is ancillary to 
a primary noncommercial purpose rationally related to the character of 
the particular defendant. In cases involving trade associations, for exam-
ple, courts have condoned certain restraints in the nature of concerted 
refusals to deal where the conduct implements a uniform rule or standard 
whose restraining effect is universal. 30 The common thread in these 
•• Proponents of greater access to professional training dispute the claim that such access 
results in greater incompetency, arguing that market forces will weed out the incompetents 
much as they determine the success of a commercial product. Such considerations are 
obviously beyond the scope of this discussion, but ought to be recognized as bearing upon 
the general issue of how far the professions can realistically be said to behave like traditional 
commercial enterprises. 
30 See Hatley v. American Quarterhorse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 653 (5th Cir. 19TI) (rule of 
association limiting amount of white on horses eligible for registration with the Association 
held to be a legitimate tool in the Association's efforts to improve the breed and not in 
contravention of rule of reason); E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour 
Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1972) (exclusion of plaintiff from listings circulated 
with defendant tour association's member airlines was justified where tour operator was not 
authorized to represent certain tourists concerns in the listings); Marjorie Webster Jr. 
College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650 
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970) (exclusion of proprietary college from associa-
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decisions is that the restraints were a byproduct of the legitimate exercise 
of self-regulatory powers designed to promote the purposes of the given 
association.31 To a lesser extent, several recent decisions involving or-
ganized sports demonstrate a similar tendency; the courts pulled back 
from strict per se treatment when presented with the unique purposes of 
those ventures. 32 Finally, courts have avoided the per se doctrine when 
tion was not a group boycott since pursuant to a general policy applied evenhandedly to all 
institutions seeking membership); Cullum Elec. & Mechanical, Inc. v. Mechanical Contrac-
tors Ass'n, 436 F. Supp. 418, 431 (D.S.C. 1976), affd, 569 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1978) (bid 
procedure of Association found to be "little more restrictive than any number of other 
administrative requirements which the general contractors might establish for themselves"; 
complaint alleging group boycott would not lie). But see Webb v. Utah Tour Brokers Ass'n, 
568 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 19TI) (tour brokers committed per se violation by forming trade 
association and thereafter working in concert to prevent their agents from obtaining ICC 
tour broker licenses so as to prevent them from entering tour broker business); McCreery 
Angus Farms v. American Angus Ass'n, 379 F. Supp. 1008 (S.D. Ill.), aff'd, 506 F.2d 1404 
(7th Cir. 1974) (without opinion) (due process considerations give rise to finding of group 
boycott). 
31 In none of these cases, however, was the restrained party prevented from competing in 
the marketplace. Where a competitor cannot perform services absent continued member-
ship in a particular trade association, competition is clearly restrained and the anticompeti-
tive effect is patent. Note that the group boycott definition includes practices that coerce 
third parties as well as exclude. Hence a trade association rule or practice which coerces the 
behavior of competitors will be deemed per se illegal. On the conceptual difficulty of 
distinguishing between a rule which coerces and one which merely regulates, compare 
Pomanowski v. Monmouth County Bd. of Realtors, 152 N.J. Super. 100, 377 A.2d 791 (19TI) 
(rule requiring brokers to join county board of realtors in order to become members of 
board's multiple listing service held to be unreasonable restraint) with Barrows v. Grand 
Rapids Real Estate Bd., 51 Mich. App. 75, 214 N.W.2d 532 (1974) (failure of real estate 
board to grant nonmembers access to multiple listing service operated for members held 
unreasonable). 
32 The leading decision favoring use of a rule of reason in antitrust litigation involving 
sports enterprises is Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), in 
which the circuit court reversed a lower court finding of per se group boycott in the League's 
exclusion of plaintiff under the so-called Rozelle Rule, which allowed NFL clubs to sign free 
agents only if able to reach an agreement with the player's former team as to compensation. 
The circuit court suggested that the case "presents unusual circumstances rendering it 
inappropriate to declare the Rozelle Rule illegal per se without undertaking an inquiry into 
the purported justifications for the Rule." Id. at 619. The court went on to conclude that the 
rule was significantly more restrictive than necessary to achieve the legitimate purposes for 
the rule claimed by the league. As to the doctrine of "less restrictive means," see text 
accompanying notes 70-81 infra. Accord, Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 
564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977); Alexander v. National Football League, [1977-2] TRADE CAs. 
(CCH) ,i 61,730 (D.Minn. 1977); Erie Buffalo Tondas v. Amateur Hockey Ass'n, 438 F. 
Supp. 310 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); Jones v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 392 F. Supp. 295 
(D. Mass. 1975); Kapp. v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974); 
College Athletic Placement Service, Inc. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, [1975-1] 
TRADE CAS. (CCH) ,i 60,lll7 (D.N.J. 1974), afj'd, 506 F.2d 1050 (3rd Cir. 1974) (without 
opinion). But see Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976). 
Notwithstanding the decision in Mackey, a number of courts have applied a test of per se 
illegality to the group boycott question in organized sports. The leading decision is undoubt-
edly Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971), stay 
vacated, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971), in which professional basketball's four-year college rule was 
successfully challenged as a per se group boycott on the grounds that it excluded players 
from the league without regard for special circumstances of individual players. Relying 
principally on Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963), the district court 
concluded that the failure to provide a hearing for the excluded athlete would preclude 
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confronted with nonexempt labor activities, opting instead for the more 
flexible balancing approach possible under the rule of reason. 33 
Viewed broadly, the trade association and sports cases reflect the 
willingness of many modem courts to consider the noncommercial pur-
poses of group conduct in assessing the conduct's anticompetitive impact. 
Recognition of a noncommercial purpose does not, however, necessarily 
render the conduct legal. Rather, it acts as a procedural touchstone from 
which a finding of reasonableness may eventually spring. The chief func-
tion of a noncommercial purpose is to expand the scope of the proceed-
ings, thus avoiding a per se finding and allowing proof of reasonableness. 
B. Noncommercial Purpose Applied to the Professions 
It is but a short step from trade associations and organized sports to the 
professions, which not only embody more classic noncommercial pur-
poses, but also exert far more extensive self-regulatory powers. As with 
trade associations, it is in the area of group boycott that the inadequacy of 
strict per se treatment of professions is most readily apparent. To consti-
tute a per se invalid group boycott, collective action must conform to the 
definition of group boycott that has been generated by the courts. The 
essential requirement of that definition is that the group activity manifest 
an anticompetitive purpose.34 Collective conduct that has been undertak-
inquiry into reasonableness. Denver Rockets has recently been followed in Linseman v. 
World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 19TI). An analysis of player discipline 
may be found in Weistart, Player Discipline in Professional Sports: The Antitrust Issues, 18 
WM. & MARY L. REv. 703 (1977). See also Note, Tackling Intercollegiate Athletics: An 
Antitrust Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 655 (1978). For a discussion of the Silver rule, see text 
accompanying notes 70-81 infra. 
33 See, e.g., Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc., [1978] 
ANTITRUST & TRAD REG. REP. (BNA) No. 847 at E-7 (D.N.J. Jan. 19, 1978): "In this 
context, a finding of per se antitrust liability seems fundamentally at odds with the Supreme 
Court's decision indicating that the policies of the antitrust acts must be balanced against 
those reflected in the labor laws.'' The court goes on to note the trend away from per se rules 
generally. See also Commerce Tankers Corp. v. National Maritime Union, 553 F.2d 793 (2d. 
Cir. 1977); Handler, Labor and Antitrust: A Part of History, 40ANTITRUST L.J. 233 (1971). 
34 See, e.g., Hatley v. American Quarterhorse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 19n); E.A. 
McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Manual Committee, 467 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973); Cartrade, Inc. v. Ford Dealers Advertising Ass'n, 
446 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1971); Bridge Corp. of America v. American Contract Bridge League, 
Inc., 428 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 940 (1971); Joseph E. Seagram & 
Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1%9), cert. denied, 396 
U.S. 1062 (1970); Deesen v. Professional Golfer's Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied. 385 U.S. 846 (1966); Chastain v. AT&T, 401 F. Supp. 151 (D.D.C. 1975); Dalmo 
Sales Co. v. Tysons Comer Regional Shopping Center, 308 F. Supp. 988 (D.D.C. 1970), 
afj'd, 429 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1976). A leading commentator has distinguished between 
collective action ''intended to coerce conduct of third parties or to secure their removal from 
competition" from group conduct that involves "the acceptance of limitations on individual 
freedom to deal not intended to coerce action by third parties or to secure their removal from 
the market." See Barber, supra note 5, at 872-79. In the latter case, the group conduct would 
avoid per se treatment because of the lack of anticompetitive purpose. Note that this 
definition requires more than a general intent to do the act and to bring about the foreseeable 
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en for a valid noncommercial purpose arguably falls outside the defini-
tion because the activity lacks the essential anticompetitive animus upon 
which a finding of group boycott depends. Consequently, courts should 
not presume anticompetitive intent and condemn the activity as per se 
unreasonable where the professional defendant can show that the conduct 
was undertaken for an arguably valid self-regulatory or otherwise non-
commercial purpose. 
This article proposes a three-pronged test to determine whether certain 
professional conduct alleged to have been undertaken for noncommercial 
purposes should be excepted from per se treatment. The first requirement 
for such an exception is that the conduct arguably fall within the legiti-
mate self-regulatory powers of the profession. If a professional society 
seeks to exclude an individual from practice on the basis of his religious 
beliefs, for example, it is doubtful that a court will permit such an action 
because it involves self-regulation, even though those religious beliefs in 
fact damage the profession and the restraints are motivated by fears of 
such damage.35 However, conduct arguably authorized by a profession's 
legislative mandate should satisfy this requirement. 
Secondly, the conduct must not primarily serve a predominantly 
profit-oriented or commercial purpose of the particular profession. The 
group boycott cases which follow suggest that refusals to deal that do not 
serve some bona fide noncommercial function should still be subject to per 
se treatment if the requisite anticompetitive purpose under the group 
boycott definition is also shown. Such an inference may be gathered from 
Goldfarb and its progeny, which indicate that some activities by profes-
sions, such as price-fixing, simply are devoid of any noncommercial 
purpose.36 
consequences of that act. Anticompetitive "purpose" is therefore to be interpreted as 
"motive" rather than mere "intent." See also note 6 supra. 
35 Many states empower the professions they regulate to refuse admission to or take 
disciplinary measures against persons who have engaged in conduct involving moral tur-
pitude or simply immorality. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE§ 1680 (1970); MICH. ST. 
BAR GRIEVANCE Bo. R. 16.18. However, courts have limited the extent to which the 
professions may exercise such powers. Se_e Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); 
Siegel v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 10 Cal. 3d 156, 110 Cal. Reptr. 15, 514 P.2d 967 
(1973). 
36 Indeed, there is nothing to indicate that the Supreme Court in Goldfarb was not 
applying a per se rule to the price-fixing arrangement in that case, and at least one federal 
court has so concluded. See United States v. National Soc'y of Prof. Engr's, 404 F. Supp. 
457 (D.D.C. 1975), a.ff d, 46 U .S.L. W. 4356 (1978). In oral argument before the Court in 
Goldfarb, Solicitor General Bork in fact pointed up the commercial-noncommercial 
dichotomy: "One searches in vain for any connection between professional ethics and 
price-fixing, and one searches in vain for the principle that price-fixing is ethical.,-, 43 
U.S.L.W. 3521, 3522 (1975). 
It is arguable, at least, that the Court's subsequent finding of classic price-fixing reflects 
an application of the per se test.exclusively to commercial activity of the professional 
association. As the Court itself observed, "It is no disparagement of the practice of law as a 
profession to acknowledge that it has this business aspect." 421 U.S. at 788. Similarly, one 
pre-Goldfarb court concluded, "[t]here is no more commercial element to the practice of 
law than the setting of fees. Thus, even the acceptance by this Court of the exemption of 
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Finally, the conduct must be undertaken in good faith, a test that 
focuses upon the reasonable man37 in the position of the professional 
defendant. In effect, the good faith test looks to the timing and sequence 
of events both leading up to and following the defendant's imposition of 
the particular restraint. 
Analysis under this test begins with the problem of ascertaining the 
limits of a profession's powers of self-regulation. One approach for de-
termining the proper scope of a profession's self-regulatory powers is to 
grant an exception to the group boycott per se rule where the industry 
structure requires self-regulation and where the collective action is essen-
tial to that self-regulation. 38 This approach would recognize self-
regulatory powers beyond those reflected in a specific legislative 
scheme.39 The "essentiality" test, however, simply does not adequately 
define what conduct is arguably valid self-regulation. On the one hand, 
self-regulatory power should not be limited to a narrow "but for" test of 
essentiality. On the other hand, self-regulatory powers having only a 
tenuous connection with delivery of professional services should not 
escape per se treatment simply because the relevant professional society 
finds the collective action to have some indirect effect upon professional 
practice. Moreover, proponents of the per se doctrine also have ques-
tioned whether any conduct the purpose of which can be achieved by less 
restrictive means should ever be valid self-regulation. 
noncommercial professional activities from the Sherman Act would not save defendant's fee 
schedules." United States v. Oregon State Bar, 385 F. Supp. 507, 517 (D. Ore. 1974). See 
also Veizaga v. National Bd. for Respiratory Therapy, [1977-1] TRADE CAs. (CCH) ,i 61,274 
(N.D. Ill. 1977). 
A current perception that a particular professional activity is a valid self-regulatory tool is 
no guarantee that the activity will be insulated from antitrust challenge. Before Goldfarb, 
minimum fee schedules were widely considered to be valid means of avoiding the evils of 
price competition among professionals and of maintaining the integrity of the profession as a 
whole. Similarly, advertising by professionals had been considered degrading to the profes-
sions, and professional societies commonly enjoined such activities. Judging from Bates v. 
Arizona State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), the Court appears not to have been persuaded by 
that argument. Bates and Goldfarb at least suggest that the line between legitimate non-
commercial activity and illegal anticompetitive activity can be very fine. 
37 See, e.g., Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. 1258, 
1270 (N.D. Fla. 1976): "[T]he dictates and policies of the antitrust laws require that the 
standard be an objective one. That is, the test of good faith is whether or not a reasonable 
man in a position of the defendants would have acted as they did under the circumstances.'' 
38 See Bird, supra note 11, at 291. 
39 Such a liberal interpretation of the extent of legitimate self-regulation stems in part from 
language in Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) that suggests a more 
flexible standard where the justification for the alleged per se conduct derives from a 
legislative mandate "or otherwise." Id. at 348-49. Just exactly what that phrase was 
intended to encompass is not clear. For one interpretation, see Note, Trade Association 
Exclusionary Practices: An Affirmative Role for the Rule of Reason, 66 CoLUM. L. REv. 
1486, 1499 (1966) (includes justifications derived from "the need for self-regulation inherent 
in the industry"). The lack of specific governmental regulation of the professions, such as 
the SEC provides for the securities exchanges, has troubled more than a few commentators. 
See Posner, The Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust 
Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 706 (1974) ("The alternative to a per se rule is to leave the 
initial determination in the hands of private parties whose own self-interest will produce an 
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The proper test of whether a given professional activity is arguably 
valid self-regulation should be whether the conduct is germane to the 
purposes of the profession's self-regulatory mandate. To an extent, this is 
simply a common sense inquiry. Whatever verbal formula is employed, 
any definition of the legitimate limits of self-regulation must take into 
account the fact that the crucial issues, as in most antitrust litigation, are 
most often factual. Whether a per se rule is properly applied to particular 
professional group conduct will be determined largely by how the trial 
court views the alleged justifications in connection with the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct: the character of the defendant, 
the nature of the restraint, and the probability that the defendant associa-
tion acted in conformity with its stated purposes. No rule of law can tell 
the trial court whether a particular activity is somehow necessary for 
self-regulation. The rule of reason has traditionally accorded trial courts 
substantial deference in the arduous task of harmonizing new and as yet 
unchallenged means of doing business with the competition policy of the 
Sherman Act. Moreover, most states have codified the concept of self-
regulation in the form of broad statutory powers conferred upon the 
specific professions. These enabling statutes generally have not attemp-
ted to outline the precise powers and duties of the various professional 
societies, but have left it to the professions themselves to define and 
enforce the applicable standards. 4° Consequently, if the profession can 
undesirable tendency to overvalue the alleged economic justifications and undervalue com-
petition."); Raynack, Restrictive Practices of Organized Medicine, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 
659 (1968) ("[l]here arises the possibility of an internal contradiction in the dual role of the 
professional organization as protector of society's welfare through the regulation of quality 
and as defender of the economic interests of the members of the organization."). See also 
Note, The Applicability of the Sherman Act to Legal Practice and Other "Non-
commercial" Activities, 82 YALE L.J. 313, 333-34 (1972). 
For a discussion of the effectiveness of professional self-regulation and whether a man-
date of self-regulation impliedly repeals the Sherman Act as to that particular self-regulated 
industry, see, e.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975); 
Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975); Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock 
Exch., 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971). The question here is 
the far less drastic one of whether the trial court is to hear evidence as to the reasonableness 
of the alleged anticompetitive conduct. The fear expressed in the "implied repeal" cases 
that the competing jurisdiction of a governmental agency may prove inadequate in 
safeguarding the public interest simply does not arise where the jurisdiction of the antitrust 
trial court is not at issue. 
•
0 See, e.g., N.Y. NoT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW§ 1406(d)(l970): 
It shall be lawful for any county medical society in this state ... to establish such 
rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the laws of the state, for the govern-
ment of its members as such county society may deem fit, provided such action 
receives the sanction of the state medical society in which such county medical 
society is represented .... 
See also CAL. Bus. & PRoF. CoDE § 1680(West Supp. 1978) (dentistry); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 2-114 (West 1969) (dentistry); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 458.1201 (West Supp. 1977) 
(medicine); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 326.130 (Vernon 1966) (accountants); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 45: 12-11 (West 1978) (optometry). 
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establish an arguable nexus between its statutory mandate and the chal-
lenged action, the conduct ought to be regarded as self-regulatory. 
A recent decision illustrates how this first test might be approached. In 
Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Association, 41 an Arizona dentist 
brought suit against a local dental association on grounds that condition-
ing participation in its programs upon membership in the related national 
association was a per se illegal tying arrangement. The dentist alleged that 
the membership requirement merely furthered the monopoly of the na-
tional association and harmed nonmember local practitioners who might 
otherwise take advantage of the local association's programs.42 The local 
association argued that the membership requirement was designed to 
promote the improvement of dental services through the funding and 
administration of dental aptitude tests, accreditation of dental programs, 
and publication and dissemination of professional journals. 43 The district 
court granted the local association's motion to dismiss on the ground that 
the conduct fell within the learned profession exemption. While reversing 
the district court on that point, the appellate court nevertheless intimated 
that the doctrine of noncommercial purpose could save the membership 
requirement, and that the association would be allowed at trial to prove 
facts in justification of the conduct: 
As we interpret the Court [in Goldfarb], to survive a Sherman 
Act challenge a particular practice, rule or regulation of a par-
ticular profession, whether rooted in tradition or the pro-
nouncements of its organizations, must serve the purpose for 
which the profession exists, viz . .. it must contribute directly to 
improving services to the public. Those which only suppress 
competition between practitioners will fail to survive the chal-
lenge. This interpretation permits a harmonization of the ends 
that both the professions and the Sherman Act serve.44 
The restraint involved in Boddicker is not unlike many trade association 
restraints: it applies uniformly to all members and is designed to further a 
fundamental noncommercial purpose of the association. Moreover, the 
dual membership requirement is essential in making the various dental 
programs possible. Establishing programs to improve standards of prac-
tice is within the power of the local societies. The dual membership 
requirement is arguably a necessary adjunct to that power and con-
sequently falls within the scope of the profession's self-regulatory man-
date. Most importantly, the closeness of the question in Boddicker, 
whether the membership requirement furthered a bona fide noncommer-
41 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3189 (1977). 
42 549 F.2d at 629. Actually, plaintiff argued alternatively that expulsion from the local 
societies for failure to pay the ADA membership dues would impair his ability to practice 
dentistry, and on the other hand that he would receive no benefit from dues paid to the 
ADA. 
43 Id. at 633. 
44 Id. at 632 (footnote omitted). 
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cial purpose of the association, suggests that the restraint is at least not so 
unambiguously anticompetitive as to warrant application of a per se rule. 
Under the second prong of the proposed test, the profession's primary 
purpose for its activity must be noncommercial if it is to avoid per se 
treatment. The critical question is whether trial courts can distinguish 
between c~nduct satisfying a legitimate noncommercial function and con-
duct having an anticompetitive purpose. In United States Dental Institute 
v. American Association of Orthodontists, 45 for example, the USDI, a 
private, profitmaking educational institution providing postsecondary 
education in orthodontia, alleged that the defendant association had en-
gaged in a group boycott by preventing practicing dentists otherwise 
unable to attain the requisite skills to practice orthodontia from participat-
ing in the USDI's educational programs. In effect, the USDI claimed that 
by refusing to recognize its programs the Association sought only to 
preserve its monopoly in the practice of orthodontia. 46 The AAO de-
fended on the grounds that it was acting to protect general practitioner 
dentists from the alleged substandard educational programs provided by 
the USDI. 
As already suggested, accreditation of educational programs is a jeal-
ously guarded self-regulatory function directly affecting the standards of 
practice among practitioners.47 Since the AAO has the power to establish 
educational standards for its members, the first element of the proposed 
test would be satisfied. Admittedly, however, the fact that the restraint 
directly inhibits nonspecialists from competing in the market for or-
thodontic services makes the asserted noncommercial purpose somewhat 
more problematic than the situation in Boddicker. Unless the AAO can 
also prove that the goal of its conduct was predominantly noncommercial, 
and thus satisfy the second element of the test, application of a rule of 
reason would be inappropriate. To prove a primary noncommercial pur-
pose, the AAO would first have to show that the dental education offered 
by the USDI is, in fact, substandard in comparison with the established 
standards of the orthodontic profession generally. Second, it would have 
to substantiate its claimed noncommercial purpose by means of corres-
pondence, complaints against the Institute, and the like, and perhaps by 
emphasizing the proprietary nature of the USD I. 48 Demonstrating that the 
USDI does not pose a significant economic threat to the AAO members 
45 396 F. Supp. 565 (N.D. Ill. 1975). 
46 Specifically, the USDI charged that the AAO acted improperly when it acted to have 
the school's license revoked, declared it unethical for a dentist to teach at the school, 
refused to publish listings of the school's journals in defendant's publication, and removed 
plaintiff from defendant's list of approved schools. Id. at 569. 
47 See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra. 
48 Tactically, emphasis upon the US Di's proprietary interest might induce the trier of fact 
to conclude that the USDI was challenging the AAO's actions for more selfish reasons than 
the desire to increase access to the practice of orthodontia. Needless to say, this tactic 
· requires that the AAO have a reasonable basis for attacking the USDI on ihose grounds. 
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would help substantiate that claim.49 If it appears that the claimed non-
commercial purpose is nonexistent, or merely ancillary to a commercial 
purpose, then the conduct should not be sustained under the noncommer-
cial purpose doctrine. This burden of proof avoids the potential injustice 
under the proposed test that might result from mechanical yet difficult to 
disprove assertions of noncommercial purpose. 
Finally, the proposed test requires that the conduct be undertaken in 
good faith as a reasonable response to a situation requiring professional 
self-regulation. Inquiry into good faith is neither as subjective nor un-
focussed as some commentators fear. A useful example of the kind of 
inquiry into good faith that a court should undertake is suggested by 
Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad. 50 There, the trial 
court was asked to determine whether the services provided by a local 
health clinic to its abortion patients were adequate, and, if inadequate, 
whether local physicians were justified in withdrawing their services from 
the clinic and discouraging nonlocal physicians from performing abortions 
there. 51 The clinic alleged in its motion for preliminary injunction that the 
physicians' motive was to destroy the clinic's abortion services, which 
were significantly lower in cost than those offered by private physicians 
and therefore posed an economic threat to those practitioners. 52 The 
court held that the defendants' good faith could be a defense to the 
allegation of anticompetitive conduct. Although the court denied the 
plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction,53 it also found that the 
defendants failed to meet their burden of establishing that they acted in 
good faith. 
The Mohammad court looked particularly at the timing and sequence of 
events, especially the fact that the withdrawal of services came shortly 
after a newspaper article comparing the cost of abortions at the clinic with 
th_ose performed by local physicians.54 Also, initial discussions among the 
defendant physicians concerning the clinic took place before defendants 
knew whether adequate care was in fact available. Finally, no clear 
standards for the allegedly substandard services had crystallized within 
49 It would be useful, for example, to show that the AAO had taken similar action against 
substandard educational programs without any resulting antitrust challenge. A presumption 
of regularity would thus defeat the assumption that the AAO was motivated by vindictive-
ness or fear of upsetting the economic status quo. 
•
0 415 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Fla. 1976). 
5 1 Suit was brought against a group of physicians for conduct undertaken in their 
capacities as private practitioners. The state medical society was never involved in the 
boycott. One physician was absolved by the trial court of any wrongdoing. No liability was 
assessed against the remaining physicians because the court was responding to a motion for 
preliminary injunction. 
52 According to an article published shortly before the restraint was instituted by the 
defendant physicians, the cost of an abortion at the Center was $150, compared to $400 if 
performed privately. Id. at 1264. 
53 The court denied the injunction because the plaintiff failed to prove a sufficient likeli-
hood of irreparable harm. Id. at 1271. 
54 Interestingly, the district court found that the Center was operating "without substan-
tial controversy" before the article appeared. Id. at 1269. 
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the medical community, and the defendants had not inquired very deeply 
into the nature of those services before instituting the restraint. 55 Inas-
much as the district court was responding to a motion for preliminary 
injunction, its inquiry into noncommercial purpose was necessarily lim-
ited. Nevertheless, the evidence indicated a substantial likelihood that the 
Center would be successful on the merits. 56 
The proposed test differs in one significant respect from the test re-
cently propounded in Linseman v. World Hockey Association 51 which 
would exempt conduct from the group boycott per se rule if ( 1) there is a 
legislative mandate for self-regulation, (2) there is collective action in-
tended to accomplish a goal consistent with the policy justifying self-
regulation and related to that goal, and,(3) there are procedural safeguards 
to prevent arbitrariness and furnish a basis for judicial review. 58 The test 
proposed by this article substitutes a good faith test for the requirement of 
procedural safeguards, because the latter test is simply inconsistent with 
the theoretical underpinnings of the per se doctrine.59 Furthermore, the 
•• The physicians had initially attacked the Center on the grounds that its advertising of 
abortion services was unethical. As to this charge, the district court similarly found that the 
physicians had not sought legal advice as to the propriety of such advertising before taking 
action against the Center. Id. at 1270. 
56 The district court also refused to find that the conduct was exempt on grounds of either 
the state action or Noerr-Pennington exemptions to the Sherman Act. See note 3 supra. 
While Mohammad thus offers a good example of the kind of practical inquiry that a trial 
court must make, the decision is marred by the court's confused use of the basic per se 
vocabulary. For example, the court stated initially that it would apply a per se rule to the 
alleged group boycott, to the extent that it would not require plaintiffs to prove that the 
conduct was unreasonable or that public harm had resulted. Had the court properly applied 
the doctrine of per se illegality, its analysis should have stopped there. However, the court 
went on to entertain defendants' good faith defense to plaintiff's "prima facie" per se case. Id. 
at 1263. While preserving the per se label, then, the court effectively converted the per se 
doctrine into a mere burden of proof issue. This is in keeping with the court's earlier 
assertion that "in the professional context the application of historic antitrust doctrines may 
be somewhat different from the application of those doctrines in purely commercial set-
tings." Id. While the court in so doing may have done a disservice to the per se doctrine, the 
result-allowing the noncommercial purpose to be scrutinized according to an implicit rule 
of reason test-was proper in view of the apparent closeness of the issue as to whether the 
collective action was taken out of regard for the quality of aftercare services at the Center. 
A final lesson to be drawn from Mohammad concerns the ability of trial courts to 
·determine standards of practice in a given profession. As the court candidly admitted, 
"[t]here is considerable difference of medical opinion within the medical community as to 
the meaning, interpretation and coercive effect of medical standards relied upon by the 
doctors who are defendants here." Id. at 1270. As in USDI, the standards of practice at 
issue in Mohammad are matters peculiarly within the expertise of the medical profession. 
The administrative cost of having trial courts resolve such disputes over professional 
standards might be intolerable; imposition of a per se rule could have a chilling effect upon 
prQfessional societies, and fear of per se liability might cause a shifting of the burden of 
regulation onto the courts. The obvious drawbacks of such a system of dispute resolution 
command that the rule of reason be applied in those cases where the self-regulatory nature of 
the conduct is arguably within the expertise of the profession. 
57 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977). The test invoked by the district court was originally 
used in Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971), stay 
vacated, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971). 
•• 439 F. Supp. at 1321. 
•• For a discussion of the relationship between procedural safeguards and the theory of 
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good faith test avoids summary condemnation of defendants under the 
antitrust laws for having engaged in conduct that, while failing to provide 
procedural safeguards, nevertheless responds to a specified self-
regulatory need. 60 
Once a court has decided to apply a rule of reason, it must determine 
how such an ad hoc determination should proceed. In situations like 
Boddicker, for example, whether the public service aspect of the conduct 
justifies the restraint depends upon the association's ability to substan-
tiate its claim that the membership requirement contributes directly to the 
improvement of professional services. The importance of the Boddicker 
case, however, is not whether the restraint is ultimately deemed reason-
able. The court's decision is significant for its recognition of this public 
service aspect as a special factor calling for a different analysis in applying 
the rule of reason than that reserved for traditional antitrust defendants. 
This analysis allows courts to offset the greater anticompetitive effect of 
certain professional practices by the correspondingly greater public inter-
est value of the particular restraint. In view of the substantial public 
interest values associated with the challenged membership requirement, 
such analysis best accommodates the conflicting interests of the antitrust 
laws and the dental profession. 
Applying the analysis suggested by the Boddicker case to the facts 
appearing in the opinion,61 several arguments favoring the reasonableness 
of the membership requirement can be made. First, if the funds generated 
by the membership requirement were allocated to various dental pro-
grams as asserted, then participation in the local programs without pay-
ment to the national association may give nonparticipating dentists a free 
ride with respect to the local programs. At the very least, such use of the 
funds belies the argument that the arrangement is intended merely to 
strengthen the hegemony of the national association. Secondly, although 
the membership requirement affects the individual dentist economically, 
the crucial variable in the court's antitrust calculus should have been the 
public welfare: if the dental programs were rationally related to the 
consumers' need for improved dental services, the mandatory nature of 
the membership requirement should not trouble the court. Indeed, the 
membership cost will probably be passed on to the consumers. 62 
The alternative to the balancing approach suggested here is potentially 
a harsh one: the per se doctrine disregards possible benefits flowing to the 
public and might subject the local association to treble damage liability.63 
per se illegality, see text accompanying notes 70--81 infra. 
60 But see Note, Trade Association Exclusionary Practices, supra note 39. 
61 See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra. 
62 Arguably the potential rise in the cost of dental services is _the real anticompetitive 
effect. Therefore, in the course of the balancing approach proposed by this article, the trial 
court should ask whether the increment in the cost of professional services is justified by the 
asserted benefits flowing to consumers from the programs administered by the national 
association. 
63 Consider, for example, the brief submitted to the Supreme Court in United States v. 
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The per se doctrine is grounded in the notion that certain practices must 
be dealt with strongly because of their pernicious effect upon competitive 
relations. Restraints like those inBoddicker, however, are designed not to 
alter competitive relations but to raise standards of practice among dental 
practitioners. Indeed, the complaining dentists in Boddicker remained 
free to compete in the market for dental services.64 
In cases like USDJ, application of a per se rule would similarly over-
look the potential harms to the profession and the public arising from the 
possibly substandard education offered by the USDI. The asserted non-
commercial purpose should be weighed in the balance particularly since 
the standards of practice out of which the restraint grew are so much 
within the expertise of the particular profession or specialization. Resort-
ing to a per se rule in situations like USDI would in effect rewrite the 
Sherman Act: a newly created educational institution could claim the 
right, according to a somewhat strained interpretation of the competition 
policy of the Act, to impose its own standards of practice upon an 
important profession and to collect treble damages where the primary 
right is violated. Clearly the Act was not intended to stand for such a 
proposition. 
Applicat.ion of a rule of reason does not necessarily constitute a 
windfall to the professional association. In a situation like USDI, 65 for 
example, a rule of reason will take into account whether the alleged abuse 
of educational standards could have been dealt with by less restrictive 
means. In effect, the court dealing with the professional defendant must 
ask whether there is some redeeming virtue in the collective action that 
outweighs.the harm to members of a particular profession and, more 
importantly, to the public. The key to this balancing process, as the 
Boddicker court suggests, ought to be the public interest. Where profes-
sional conduct is ''highly regulated by the state, and intimately concerns 
the public health and welfare, " 66 the rule of reason "best balances the 
policies of the antitrust laws with the public welfare burden"67 borne by 
the professions. 68 
National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs. The Society argued that its ban on competitive bidding was 
"indispensable to public safety and health," in that problems in engineering precluded 
realistic estimates on a particular job without the benefit of various reports and studies. 
Thus, the Society concluded that the imposition of a per se rule by the lower courts in that 
case had elevated "judicial administration to a higher priority than public safety." See 
[1978] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 847 at A-16. 
64 Again, a different situation might arise if a physician were prevented from using local 
hospital facilities essential to his practice because of his refusal to join a national association. 
A rule of reason analysis would be unlikely to uncover a sufficient policy justification for the 
exclusion to offset the competition policy embodied in the Sherman Act. 
65 See text accompanying notes 45-49 supra. 
66 Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. at 1263. 
61 Id. 
88 The recent experience in Michigan of an attempt by the Michigan State Medical Society 
to boycott Michigan Blue Cross-Blue Shield, the state's largest health insurer, is a telling 
example of the dangers inherent in overreliance upon per se rules. The Society, a state 
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Notwithstanding the substantive arguments against applying per se 
rules to the narrow range of professional activities satisfying the proposed 
test, courts and commentators have raised several criticisms of the rule of 
reason. These criticisms focus mainly upon the procedural difficulties of 
applying a rule of reason to the conduct embraced by the test and suggest 
that the administrative burdens would prove intolerable. For reasons 
discussed below, these fears appear to be largely illusory and point up the 
confusion that has characterized the courts' approaches to the use of per 
se rules. 
Critics of the rule of reason argue that the timesaving benefits of per se 
rules will be lost by having courts hear evidence on noncommercial 
purpose since trial courts must first determine in plenary proceedings 
whether a particular practice somehow relates to some legitimate self-
regulatory goal. 69 Following the lead set by Justice Goldberg in Silver v. 
New York Stock Exchange, 70 several courts have required that organiza-
tions excluding a third party in the name of self-regulation observe certain 
procedural safeguards in order to furnish a basis for judicial review and to 
prevent arbitrariness. 71 Silver involved the termination by the Exchange 
of a nonmember's wire service in the belief that the broker-dealer had 
engaged in various abuses of the over-the-counter market. 72 The reason 
for the termination was never communicated to the excluded trader, and 
no hearing was provided for him to respond to the undisclosed charges. 
The Supreme Court held that, while section 6 of the Securities Exchange 
Act73 mandated the Exchange to regulate the conduct of its members and 
physician group, resolved to boycott a plan instituted by "the Blues" to sign up physicians 
for a new scheme of reimbursement for services, the effect of which is to enable participat-
ing physicians to earn substantially more than nonparticipating physicians. The Society 
opposes the plan because it is an unacceptable extension of control over the practice of 
physicians by "the Blues." Whether or not the Society's fears are valid-and following from 
that, whether or not the collective action was a legitimate exercise of the profession's 
self-regulatory powers-involves a complex range of economic and social issues that are 
best resolved in full plenary proceedings. If the insurer's plan results in a deepening schism 
between participating and nonparticipating physicians, the scheme might well engage the 
strong concern of the Society. See Detroit Free Press, Oct. 27, 1977, at IA, col. 4; Id., Oct. 
29, 1977, at 3A col. 2. 
69 As ordinarily employed, a per se rule would exclude evidence of reasonableness 
altogether. Although the proposed test would allow such evidence to come before the court, 
it would not be necessary to consume trial time in order to review these proofs. See text 
accompanying note 81 infra. 
10 373 U.S. 341 (1963). 
71See, e.g., Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971), 
stay vacated, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971). See also text accompanying notes 57-59 supra. 
72 The abuses mentioned included plaintiff's failure to disclose his and his wife's connec-
tions with various enterprises, the fact that plaintiff's security clearance with the Defense 
Department had been revoked, and reports of general untrustworthiness and unreliability. 
See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 302 F.2d 714, 716 (2d Cir. 1962). 
73 15 u.s.c. § 78(f) (1970). 
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impliedly that of nonmembers with whom members necessarily deal in the 
over-the-counter market, the Exchange's failure to provide adequate 
procedural safeguards, without more, rendered its conduct unreasonable. 
The primary justification given by Justice Goldberg was that termination 
of a broker-dealer's wire service without notice or hearing provides no 
mechanism to check arbitrary exclusions by the Exchange. A second 
justification was that lack of a hearing and consequential absence of a 
record make it virtually impossible for courts to determine whether a per 
se rule should apply at the onset without engaging in possibly protracted 
and unnecessary factfinding. According to Silver, a hearing requirement 
gives the trial court the alternative of looking to the hearing record in 
making its initial determination. 74 
A hearing requirement is an unacceptable solution to the problem of 
providing the court with a basis for imposing a per se rule because the 
record generated by a private hearing may itself lack procedural 
safeguards. Unlike a court oflaw, a hearing is not likely to have a binding 
effect upon the parties and provides none of the discovery devices that 
often prove decisive in the antitrust context. In practice, an excluded 
party will seldom rest content with the suspect conclusion of an in-house 
panel that the exclusion was for a noncommercial purpose and therefore 
justified. Even a formal hearing will be hampered by an inability to get the 
facts out. Courts may ultimately find themselves policing the fairness' of 
such hearings, thus swapping one administrative burden for another. 75 
The hearing required by Silver is also an unacceptable solution to the 
problem of arbitrariness. As Silver has been interpreted by the courts, 
lack of procedural safeguards is ipso facto unreasonable under the Sher-
man Act. 76 This interpretation is perhaps intended to reflect the doctrine 
of less restrictive means, which focuses upon the antitrust defendant's 
ability to achieve its declared noncommercial purpose by some less re-
strictive course of action. A hearing, therefore, would constitute the less 
restrictive means in the Silver example. By equating the lack of pro-
cedural safeguards with a finding of unreasonableness, however, the 
1
• 373 U.S. at 362. 
75 If, as some commentators suggest, the hearing requirement is really a kind of unwritten 
confrontation clause, such a confrontation is likely to be "full of sound and fury, signifying 
nothing." Complainants the size of the USDI or Blue Cross will inevitably press their claims 
in court despite an adverse outcome at the hearing. Of course, antitrust complainants should 
not be subjected to the costs of litigation where a simple hearing or arbitration would suffice. 
Indeed, the desirability of self-regulation is based in part upon a need to relieve the courts of 
the burden of regulating the professions themselves. Ultimately, however, these institu-
tional confrontations are going to wind up in the courts, and while litigiousness should not be 
encouraged, there is some sense in having the antitrust laws administered in courts of law 
rather than in isolated conference rooms. 
76 See, e.g., Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1322 (D. Conn. 1977). 
Ironically, Silver has also been read to say that a court may pull back from per se treatment, 
even though there is no express statutory mandate of self-regulation, when faced with some 
justification presented by the circumstances surrounding the conduct in question. In effect, 
this latter interpretation merely restates the traditional rule of reason. See, e.g., Note, Trade 
Association Exclusionary Practices, supra note 39, at 1500: "An identifiable public policy 
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Silver court inflated the theory of per se illegality to constitutional dimen-
sions by engrafting concepts of due process onto the Sherman Act and 
subjecting antitrust defendants to treble damage liability for conduct that 
has not been proven anticompetitive. 
Courts following the Silver rationale have sometimes spoken of a rule of 
reason exception to per se illegality where the conduct has been underta-
ken with the requisite procedural safeguards. 77 Not only does this stand 
traditional antitrust analysis on its head, but, like Silver, penalizes the 
defendant who has arguably acted in good faith to deal with a particular 
abuse. The premise of per se illegality is that the proscribed conduct is 
clearly anticompetitive; yet in applying a per se test due to lack of a 
hearing, a court does not even reach the substance of the restraint. The 
better view is that lack of procedural safeguards should be relevant but 
not dispositive. 78 As Justice Stewart asserts in his dissent to Silver, 
"[t]here might be cases in which the public interest would demand that at 
least preliminary disciplinary action be taken with swift effectiveness. " 79 
As he understands the majority opinion, the Exchange's exclusion with-
out a hearing could not be defended by showing that the plaintiff was an 
unmitigated swindler, even if proof of that fact were available to an 
absolute certainty. He concludes that the Securities Exchange Act should 
be interpreted to remove antitrust liability for actions taken in good faith 
to effectuate an exchange's statutory duty of self-regulation. While this 
article does not adopt Justice Stewart's position that the Exchange Act 
impliedly repealed the Sherman Act with respect to such self-regulatory 
practices, it does contend that good faith self-regulatory conduct should 
receive more favorable consideration by the courts than the per se doc-
trine allows. 80 The mainspring of the per se mechanism is not whether the 
favoring industry self-regulation need not, under the Silver rationale, find its inspiration in a 
statute, state or federal." The author nevertheless upholds Justice Goldberg's "safeguards" 
analysis. The Silver court itself remarked, 373 U.S. at 360: 
[nhe entire public policy of self-regulation, beginning with the idea that the 
Exchange may set up barriers to membership, contemplates that the Exchange will 
engage in restraints of trade which might well be unreasonable absent sanction by 
the Securities Exchange Act .... Under the aegis of the rule of reason, traditional 
antitrust concepts are flexible enough to permit the Exchange sufficient breathing 
space within which to carry out the mandate of the Securities Exchange Act. 
See also Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 433 F.2d 264, 268 (7th Cir. 1970), 
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971): "[T]he Court [in Silver] concluded that the proper 
approach is an analysis which reconciles the operation of both statutory schemes ... with 
one another rather than holding one completely ousted." 
77 Indeed, during oral argument in United States v. National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs, Justice 
Rehnquist discussed the rule of reason exception with counsel for petitioners. See [1978) 
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 847 at A-20. 
78 Cf. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 n.26 1977, where the 
majority notes that while the location restriction used by Sylvania was neither "[t]he least 
nor the most restrictive provision that it could have used," nevertheless, "a per se rule 
based on the nature of the restriction is, in general, undesirable." 
79 373 U.S. at 368. See also Robinson, supra note 12, at 231. 
80 Significantly, the Mohammad court chose to implement a good faith defense which 
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defendant has done everything short of violating the Act, but whether the 
activity complained of is on its face so typical of the evils the Sherman 
Act was meant to proscribe that the court need not inquire any further. 
Lack of notice or hearing simply does not respond to this latter inquiry. 
The doctrine of less restrictive means discussed above responds to the 
fear that, without strict due process requirements, professional societies 
will never be held accountable for abuse of their self-regulatory mandate. 
This fear is better alleviated by the traditional rule of reason, which errs 
only to the extent that it calls for a more protracted inquiry, than by the 
per se doctrine, which not only ignores defendant's justifications but 
imposes harsh penalties for possibly reasonable self-regulatory conduct. 
Moreover, applying the rule of reason need not be unusually burdensome: 
a profession's justification can be spelled out with particularity in the 
pleadings, supported by data, affidavits, or exhibits substantiating the 
claimed noncommercial purpose. Through discovery, the party alleging 
the group boycott can muster opposing evidence. Upon some minimum 
showing, the trial judge can make a pretrial determination that the rule of 
reason ought to apply. By this means, the expense of trying frivolous or 
bad faith claims of noncommercial purpose can be avoided.81 
Some commentators fear that under the approach advanced by this 
article trial courts will abuse their discretion in finding that particular 
group conduct was or was not prosecuted for self-regulatory or noncom-
mercial reasons. They also make the broader criticism that trial courts are 
simply not competent to deal with the complex business and economic 
does not require a hearing. See note 37 supra. 
[11he very purpose of an exchange is to exclude nonmembers from participation in 
trading. Were it not for the legislative authorization of such exchanges, they would 
constitute group boycotts that are per se violations of the Sherman 
Act .... Thus .... some accommodation must be reached between usual anti-
trust principles and the self-regulatory and exclusionary powers that the exchanges 
were obviously intended to exercise. 
Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 314 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
81 A recent example of the "fine line" analysis with which courts are likely to be 
confronted involves a suit by a group of small and medium sized accounting firms against the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), charging that the self-
regulatory changes adopted recently by the organization will decrease competition within 
the accounting profession. Essentially, the changes create a new class of membership for 
accounting firms, as opposed to individual accountants, with separate sections for firms 
auditing publicly held and privately held corporations. Were the plaintiff firms, who are 
seeking injunctive relief, to bring an antitrust action alleging group boycott, the AICPA 
would have strong grounds for arguing that the changes, approved by the Institute's 
governing council, serve a distinctly noncommercial purpose in seeking to establish proce-
dures for a public oversight board, sanctions against derelict firms and mandatory peer 
reviews. Indeed, it is maintained that the changes were made in response to congressional 
criticism of the accounting profession concerning laxity in auditing certain corporate clients. 
Conversely, since the changes were not subscribed to by the entire membership of the 
association, smaller accounting firms might well charge that the changes are a disguised 
power play on the part of the larger firms. At the very least, the situation suggests that there 
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matters presented to the court under this standard. 82 Of course, appellate 
review is available where the trial court clearly abuses its discretion, 
although, as one court has observed in noting the trend away from the use 
of per se rules, " 'the law in Washington ... is quite different from the law 
in the rest of the country.' " 83 The competency issue is a two-edged 
sword, because a trial court that is considered too incompetent to apply 
the test proposed in this article ought to be considered equally incompe-
tent to decide that certain conduct is clearly anticompetitive and therefore 
per se illegal. 84 Regardless of their competency, trial courts are and will 
continue to rule upon complex issues in the absence of legislative answers 
to these problems. 85 In the meantime, the implementation of a per se rule, 
which holds defendants liable for treble damages on the basis of greatly 
abbreviated proceedings, is a high price for avoiding trial court considera-
tion of the economic and social realities of a given industry or activity. 86 
Proponents of the per se test argue that by allowing professions to raise 
the argument of noncommercial purpose, the courts will invariably find 
themselves faced with professional societies intoning the talismanic con-
cept of self-regulation only as a means of extending and solidifying their 
monopoly of the profession. 87 This bubble of suspicion surrounding pro-
fessional activities is not easily burst. Moreover, from an administrative 
standpoint, expanding the scope of judicial review might appear to give 
professions an added weapon in their arsenal of dilatory tactics. How-
ever, the test proposed by this article expands the scope of proceedings 
are sufficient indicia of good faith on the part of the AICPA to allow a trial court to entertain 
a defense of noncommercial purpose if such an action were brought. See N .Y. Times, Jan. 9, 
1978, at 02, col. I. 
82 See, e.g., Bird, supra note 11, at 279: "The rule of reason approach would call upon 
judges to decide cases based on nothing more convincing than their own set of values and 
policy preferences which may or may not be shared by the public at large or their elected 
representatives." 
83 Cullum Elec. & Mechanical, Inc. v. Mechanical Contractors Ass'n, 436 F. Supp. 418, 
428 (D.S.C. 1976), affd, [1978-1] TRADE CAs. (CCH) ,i 61,866 (4th Cir. 1978) (quoting from 
Wooley, Is a Boycott a Per Se Violation of the Antitrust Laws? 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 773, 
774 (1974)). 
84 Consider, for example, Professor Areeda 's observation that "judges and commentators 
don't really understand antitrust. They deal with it at the level of jargon. Past the jargon, the 
problem is a lack of consensus as to what does and does not pay off for the special good." 
N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1976, at 43, col. 6. 
85 Cf. Kauper, supra note 14, at 330 (in which Professor Kauper disparages the tendency 
of trial courts to shun economic analyses). Another commentator has described the trial 
judge's responsibility as "the awesome task of continually creating and recreating the 
Sherman Act out of his understanding of economics and his conception of the requirements 
of the judicial process." Bork, supra note 14, at 48. 
86 Justice Stevens has recently cautioned that "the Court should adhere to its settled 
policy of giving concrete meaning to the general language of the Sherman Act by a process of 
case-by-case adjudication of specific controversies." Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 
U.S. 579, 603 (1975). 
87 See Bird, supra note 11, at 281-82. 
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only for those professional activities that carry sufficient indicia of valid-
ity. Use of this test therefore avoids the problem of courts granting the 
professions too much deference. 
In response to the suggested administrative problem, one discussion of 
the group boycott cases has attempted to formulate an extremely precise 
definition of "group boycott" that would serve as a flat rule for profes-
sional conduct. 88 It is more likely, however, that the courts will continue 
to mark out the boundaries of group boycott on a case-by-case basis, 
perhaps because of the general intractability of anticompetitive purposes 
and effects. Initially, the costs of the test proposed by this article to 
professional activities may be considerable. However, the advantages of 
building a rational foundation for the application of per se rules to profes-
sional conduct, rather than importing the present rules of per se illegality 
wholecloth are more substantial. As Justice Blackmun has commented in 
another context: 
No doubt such a rule of reason will crystallize, as it is applied, 
into various per se rules relating to certain kinds of state enact-
ments, such as the regulation of the classic monopoly, the public 
utility. We should not shrink in our general approach, however, 
from what seems to me our constitutionally mandated task, one 
often set for us by conflicting federal and state laws, and that is 
the balancing of implicated federal and state interests with a 
view to assuring that when these are truly in conflict, the former 
prevail. 89 
The same care in balancing the policy goals of the Sherman Act against 
state interests should be taken in the context of professional activities. 
Professional services provide important benefits for consumers among 
the states which could be jeopardized by overzealous use of the per se 
formulae. 
In cases not involving group boycott, application of rules of per se 
illegality to certain professional activities may be desirable despite the 
costs resulting for the public or the particular profession. Price-fixing, 
tying arrangements, and other egregious activities should not escape per 
se condemnation simply because they enjoy the respectability of having 
been mandated by the ethical rules of a given profession. In these cases, 
courts should not hesitate to pierce the veil of professional self-regulation 
during their inquiries into noncommercial purpose. 
Some guidance on this issue has been provided by the Supreme Court's 
recent decision in United States v. National Society of Professional 
Engineers, 90 a case involving alleged price-fixing in the form of an abso-
lute ban against competitive bidding by members of the Society. In 
88 See Note, Boycott: A Specific Definition Limits the Applicability of a Per Se Rule, 71 
Nw. U.L. REv. 818 (1977). 
89 Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1975) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
90 46 U.S.L.W. 4356 (1978), affg 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
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affirming the district court's holding that the agreement constituted clas-
sic price-fixing, 91 the Court discounted the Society's contention that the 
ban minimized the risk that competition would produce inferior engineer-
ing work and endanger the public safety, calling it a "fundamental misun-
derstanding" of the rule of reason.92 In discussing the rule of reason, the 
Court asserted that ''the inquiry mandated by the · Rule of Reason is 
whether the challenged· agreement is one that promotes competition or 
one that suppresses competition. " 93 To the extent that the ban on competi-
tive bidding clearly suppressed competition, the Court deemed the 
agreement illegal "[o]n its face. " 94 
It is not clear that the Court thereby intended to mean that the ban on 
competitive bidding was a per se restraint. While the finding of illegality 
"on its face" connotes per se condemnation, the Court throughout its 
opinion speaks as though it was in fact undertaking the inquiry mandated 
by the Rule of Reason mentioned above. Thus while the Court acknow-
ledges the cautionary footnote in Goldfarb and expresses the view that 
"professional services may differ significantly from other business ser-
vices, and, accordingly, the nature of the competition in such services 
may vary, " 95 the Court seemingly departs from that liberal view by then 
suggesting that only those professional practices that have no anticom-
petitive effect will be deemed to fall within the rule of reason.96 While the 
Court's language is certainly dictum, it suggests a retrenchment from the 
more optimistic forecast of the Goldfarb Court that certain professional 
restraints might be treated differently from traditional business practices. 
As Justice Blackmun concludes in his concurring opinion, "I am not at all 
certain that the Court leaves enough elbow room for realistic application 
of the Sherman Act to professional services.' '97 A different case might be 
presented if the bidding ban in NSPE was not such an absolute interdic-
tion of price information and was' 'more closely confined to the legitimate 
objective of preventing deceptively low bids. " 98 As the circuit court 
91 404 F. Supp. 457 (D.D.C. 1975), remanded in pan, 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977). On 
remand from the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Goldfarb, the district court 
rejected the Society's contention that Goldfarb required application of the rule of reason. 
404 F. Supp. at 460. The question presented to the Court on certiorari was whether the rule 
of reason should apply in an antitrust attack on a professional ethics rule governing solicita-
tion by bidding. 
9 2 46 U.S.L.W. at 4356. 
93 Id. at 4359. 
9< Id. 
95 Id. at 4360. 
96 In supporting its view that certain ethical restraints of professions may be justified, the 
Court used the analogy of "market restraints related to the safety of a product" which 
"have no anticompetitive effect and ... are reasonably ancillary to the seller's main purpose 
of protecting the public from harm or itself from product liability." Id. at n.22 (emphasis 
added). 
97 Id. at 4361. 
98 555 F.2d at 983. 
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concluded, "The issue is not one of mere semantics, it is one of accurate 
identification of a rule having regard to its language, purpose and ef-
fect. " 99 In view of the similarity of the price-fixing charge in NSPE to that 
in Goldfarb, it is not surprising that the Court chose not to use this case to 
carve an exception for arguably self-regulatory conduct out of the normal 
rules of per se illegality. The implications of some of the Court's language, 
however, go well beyond the facts of this particular case. Whether the 
Court's singular emphasis on competition in N SPE shall extend to all 
forms of professional self-regulation is a matter of speculation. The Court 
should attempt to illuminate further the commercial/noncommercial dis-
tinction it noted in Goldfarb with the aim of lending greater certainty to 
self-regulatory practices currently engaged in by the professions. 
CONCLUSION 
Although no firm consensus exists as to the social and economic goals 
of the Sherman Act, it is at least clear that per se rules arose out of the 
courts' experience with commercial activities whose purposes and an-
ticompetitive effects differ significantly from those of the professions. 
The mechanical application of per se rules of illegality in the professional 
setting contradicts the basic rule that only unreasonable restraints are 
condemned by the Sherman Act. Since the courts are presently operating 
without the benefit oflong experience with the professions in the antitrust 
arena, the conclusions garnered from traditional commercial practices 
should not be carried over unthinkingly to professional practices. The 
delay between the formulation of the rule of reason and the later adoption 
of the various per se rules reflects commendable caution on the part of the 
courts not to engage in antitrust overkill. That same spirit of caution 
should obtain where, as at present, enforcement of the antitrust laws is 
being carried out against complex and changing industries. 
This article provides an approach to professional activities that does 
justice both to the theory of per se illegality under the Sherman Act and to 
those noncommercial purposes that are intrinsic to a profession. The 
proposed test is intended to provide a focus for determining whether 
conduct engaged in by professionals should be excepted from the applica-
tion of per se rules. Under that test, a per se rule would not be applied to 
conduct that (1) is arguably within the self-regulatory powers of the given 
profession, (2) serves a predominantly noncommercial purpose of the 
profession, and (3) has been undertaken in good faith, that is, a reasonable 
man in the position of the defendant would have undertaken similar 
efforts at self-regulation under the circumstances. If the conduct is re-
moved from the per se category, the public interest values served by the 
conduct should be determined in order to judge whether the anticompeti-
99 Id. at 984. 
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tive effect is outweighed by the benefits flowing to consumers of profes-
sional services. 
Based upon the courts' experience with certain recurring professional 
practices, various per se rules may eventually emerge under the approach 
recommended by this article. However, until the "business and economic 
stuff'' 100 of a given profession's activities have been reduced to predicta-
ble patterns, ad hoc determinations as to the appropriateness ofa claim of 
noncommercial purpose are preferable to the unchecked extension of per 
se rules into this new area of the courts' antitrust jurisdiction. 
-Jonathan Cobb Dickey 
•
00 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963). 
